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ABSTRACT 
Since the 1930’s, agricultural policy has played a major role in stabilizing the United States 
agricultural economy.  Agricultural policy is a minor player in terms of overall federal budgetary 
impact, but the programs remain significant for US producers.  Understanding how changes to 
farm safety net programs would affect government expenditures would be beneficial in 
maintaining and refining agricultural support programs into the future.  
The objective of the project was to create a model that uses stochastic simulation to 
estimate expenditures or score agricultural policy changes, for 9 major agricultural commodities.  
The study used many of the factors that the federal government uses to accomplish the same goal 
including calculating payments based on a national scale.  This was intentional because estimates 
for this project were expected to approximate the scores achieved by the Congressional Budget 
Office.  As part of the analysis, a State based model was created as an alternative approach to 
scoring the main agricultural support programs.  This alternative was compared to the original 
approach to determine differences between the two in terms of effectiveness and detail provided 
when estimating future program payments.  
This research provided models that score the programs as they are currently, but allows 
for modifications to be made on various parameters.  This has provided – and will continue to 
provide – the ability to evaluate effects of proposed program changes on projected program 
payments.   
The results of the study indicate the national model scored projected program payments 
more accurately than the state model structure.  However, after both models were adjusted to 
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limit the difference in the PLC projected payments and CBO, the state model preformed more 
closely to CBO.  
The models are a useful tool for current analysis of ARC and PLC program expectations. 
Even more valuable though, is the potential to analyze future proposals to these programs.  With 
that in mind, the national model is far more seamless to adjust program parameters, and the state 
model enables the regional effects of program changes to be seen.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1930’s, agricultural policy has played a major role in stabilizing the United States 
agricultural economy.  Legislators involved in the writing of the last farm bill that doesn’t expire, 
the Agricultural Act of 1949 (1949 farm bill) recognized the importance of addressing the 
dynamic needs of the agricultural sector regularly. As a result, subsequent agricultural acts, or 
‘farm bills’ as they are commonly referred to, have each been written to expire roughly every 
five years since the 1970s.  This expiration creates a sense of urgency for future Congresses to 
act to pass farm bills or face reverting back to the provisions of the act of the 1940’s.  This 
provision is uncommon amongst other non-agricultural legislation.  Regularly passing farm bills 
has enabled legislators to attempt to tailor changes in farm support programs to reflect producers’ 
needs depending on the current state of the farm economy.  
An important component of the farm bill deliberation process is the scoring of the 
legislation.  Scoring is a term that refers to development of cost estimates for the proposed 
changes relative to Baseline or status quo estimates.  Prior to 1974, many of the functions 
performed now by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) were undertaken by analysts within 
the administration (Page 2005).  However, in an effort to remove partisan issues that often arose 
over cost estimates, Congress passed the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 
1974 that requires CBO to work with Congressional budget committees.  CBO provides cost 
estimates or “scores” of all legislation that has potential to change government spending.  The 
goal of scoring is to make congress aware of the amount of funding going toward each individual 
part of major legislation, along with providing an overall cost of the entire bill.  Scoring is used 
in agricultural policy as each farm bill is being developed to ensure the new farm bill does not 
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spend more than the budget for the bill.  The farm bill includes about 12 titles, depending on the 
bill, encompassing everything from commodity support programs, to Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP), to conservation programs, to federal crop insurance.   
Agricultural producers and their commodity organizations are routinely asked to provide 
policy suggestions prior to the development of each farm bill.  Groups often have several 
suggestions for potential policy changes, however, without knowing the cost of their policy 
proposals they have no idea what would be financially feasible.  If they ask for a change that is 
too expensive it may be dismissed once CBO scores the changes.  They may not get an 
opportunity to ask for additional changes beyond this point, and thus lose their chance to reform 
agricultural policy.  Therefore, it is important to develop a scoring tool that can be used to assist 
producers, their associations and other interest groups in developing policy proposals that fit 
within budget guidelines. 
Objectives 
The primary objective of this thesis is to create a model that uses stochastic simulation to score 
changes in the two major agricultural support mechanisms, agricultural risk coverage (ARC) and 
price loss coverage (PLC), for 9 major agricultural commodities.  The model will use many of 
the parameters and prices from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline in order to best 
approximate the CBO score of the same policy proposals.  An alternative methodology will be 
developed and evaluated to determine which method provides the most similar payment 
projections to the CBO baseline.   
 The first approach scores the cost of programs based on nationally averaged parameters 
which is the approach CBO uses.  The alternative methodology that will be used is to evaluate 
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predicted program costs for each major state, and then aggregating them to form national 
expenditures estimates.  This aggregation of data will be explained further in Chapter III.  The 
state based model will provide more specific yield variability than the national model.  Both 
approaches will be compared to the 2019 CBO Baseline to see which is the most effective.  
Justification 
Changes to farm safety net programs are regularly proposed by agricultural interest groups.  A 
model that mimics CBO Baseline scoring for ARC and PLC creates ample opportunities to 
analyze potential changes.  This research develops a model that scores the programs as they are 
currently but allows for modifications to be made on various parameters.  This gives the user the 
ability to evaluate the effect of potential program changes on government expenditures.  The 
user-friendly design of the model makes it suitable for a wide range of users and is, therefore, 
available for more what-if analyses.   
Budgetary pressure frequently dictates which aspects of the agricultural policy 
framework will be retained, modified, or cut.  Policy influencers have an advantage when 
proposal ideas are presented with facts and well-researched potential outcomes, specifically 
related to budget effects.  The ability to estimate the cost of commodity program changes helps 
validate a policy proposal.  
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 U.S. Agriculture relies heavily on the stability provided by the safety net programs 
provided by government programs.  These programs are required to be reauthorized and 
potentially updated roughly every five years with the passage of a new farm bill.  During this 
legislative process, it is required that the programs be scored by the CBO to create a baseline 
estimate of the cost of the programs assuming no changes to current program provisions.  The 
score created by CBO is essential because the expected cost of a program can set the tone for 
how it is viewed by congress, as well as, the public during the legislative process.   
Scoring History 
In his work on policy analysis, Manski discusses what he refers to as inappropriate certitude 
(Manski, 2011).  The desire for certainty and the peace of mind created by a forecast with 
simplicity that reflects a confident determination.  The author argues, that the presentation of 
information in policy analysis should not be reflected in this way.  In policy analysis, there are 
numerous variables that cannot be predicted with 100 percent certainty.  The directly relatable 
point in Manski’s work is that CBO reports scores that imply certitude in spite of the uncertainty 
of the assumptions made in order to create a 10 year forecast.  Acknowledging the challenge of 
choosing the correct system of presenting risk, the author proposes that one process would be to 
present a low and high score based on various possible future circumstances and present both 
figures so that the user of the analysis has a clearer picture of the potential costs of the program 
being viewed.  Although this methodology is not the most sophisticated, Manski raises many 
valid concerns.  
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In an extensive explanation of CBO scoring, Page reveals the introduction of the scoring 
process to congress in the Congressional Budget act of 1974.  He describes that by definition a 
legislative score must be presented as a point estimate, and explains how this is necessary to 
make the scoring baselines more clear and concise. 
In their work on the 1996 farm bill, Jagger and Hull explain the benefits of introducing a 
one-sided bet probability scoring model.  According to the article, the research was relevant after 
the 1996 farm bill because the probability scoring model was used significantly for the first time 
in the farm bill process.  In brief, the probability scoring concept aims to capture change in 
outlays due to shifts or changes from current circumstances, such as prices and yields.  They 
introduce this methodology in contrast to the normal point-estimate procedure that has been 
commonly used in the CBO scoring process.  This presentation is simple to understand by 
someone with limited knowledge of the program or industry, but does not reflect the amount of 
uncertainty around the point estimates.  A brief example is as follows: if we expect that policy 
will drive wheat production down slightly in the coming years, then we can expect that wheat 
price will slightly increase.  Thus, the policy forecast could take into account the new expected 
price when predicting program outlays for that year.  The authors suggest the use of the one-
sided bet as a forecasting system that does not change the cost of a given program in the baseline 
scenario.  However, the one-sided bet does account for a possible change in the policy 
parameters which could change total outlays.  In practice, the one-sided bet was only taken into 
account when the analysis led to an increase in program costs.  An example the authors noted of 
a one-sided bet that was analyzed during the 1996 farm bill reconciliation is: increasing a 
commodity loan rate to just below baseline market prices.  In this particular case study, the 
authors determine probability scoring was appropriate and effective in their analysis.  This 
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influence further validates the current project, but differs in that the current project will create 
500 payment estimations that may be used to create an entire distribution of expected payments 
above and below the baseline.  
Stochastic Forecasting in Agricultural Policy Analysis 
Richardson, Klose, and Gray provide a detailed description of the usefulness of simulation in 
their work on multivariate empirical (MVE) probability distributions. Similarly, this thesis will 
utilize simulation, but will differ in that the forecasts will be taken from the Food and Policy 
Research Institute (FAPRI) at the University of Missouri as opposed to being created on a MVE 
distribution.  The authors also explain the use of simulation of at least 500 iterations over 
whatever probability distribution is chosen.  This scoring model will use simulation to establish 
expected means, and the probability density functions (PDF) for each projected payment for 
ARC and PLC.  As is the case in the Richardson and Klose paper, simulation strengthens the 
findings. 
Richardson, Outlaw, and Raulston analyzed the potential payments for ARC county 
(ARC-CO) and PLC from 2016 – 2021 for the United States.  Their work explained the way the 
programs functioned based on the provisions of the 2014 farm bill.  They discuss how the abrupt 
decline in commodity prices is what caused ARC-CO to be a favorable choice for corn and 
soybean farmers specifically.  This analysis is applicable to the current research because 
movements like the one from 2011-2016 that caused high ARC-CO payments, could be a 
possible explanation of why the program pays well again in this analysis, or not.  Beyond a brief 
historical explanation of the programs, the goal of their project was to arrive at payment 
projections from ARC-CO and PLC for the years 2016-2021.  The details of this article outline 
how payments can be forecasted on a county level for the major covered commodities and then 
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aggregated.  The uncertainty of the future is accounted for by simulating probabilistic forecasts 
of the ARC-CO and PLC payments for each year 500 times.  Their results show that the original 
thoughts that high ARC-CO payments on a national scale, were due to the high grain prices of 
the past, but will not be sustained without continued price decline holds true with the ARC-CO 
projection of $45.9/acre for 2016 versus $8.62/acre for 2021.  The methodology used aggregate 
to the national level in their study is similar to what will be required to create a stochastic scoring 
model that shows total program outlays for both of these programs.  The difference is that 
Richardson, Outlaw and Raulston based the payments off of county level information, and this 
project will use both national and state level models that are aggregated.  The formulas to 
calculate payments are very similar between the PLC and ARC-CO of the 2014 farm bill, and the 
PLC and ARC of the 2018 farm bill because the programs only changed marginally.   
The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at the University of 
Missouri provides analysis and projections on agricultural markets and policies (FAPRI, 2019).  
This study utilizes the baseline projections from the FAPRI 2019 Baseline Outlook for mean 
price, and yield projections.  The FAPRI means are based on a range of projected market 
outcomes that account for uncertainty in each price and yield figure.  The range is spread over 
500 possible outcomes for each respective price and yield over the 10-year projection and based 
on a unique probability distribution.  Due to the partnership between FAPRI and the Agricultural 
and Food Policy Center (AFPC) at Texas A&M University, this study is able to use the specific 
500 price and yield draws from each year, explained above, to calculate expected payments.  The 
risk associated with each crop’s price and yield will then be used to create a distribution around 
the CBO mean prices and yields from the January 2019 CBO Baseline.  This application of risk 
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based on FAPRI’s price and yield distributions is necessary because the CBO baseline does not 
report how their model assigns risk on their projections. 
The results of this study will be compared to the January 2019 CBO Baseline.  A one 
sample t-test will be conducted for each of the ARC and PLC payment projections to achieve the 
comparison.  In this common statistical test, the population mean is the CBO Baseline projection 
and the sample mean is the payment projected by this study.  The t-statistic will be used to get p-
values by comparing them against tabulated values that indicate the likelihood of the population 
mean hitting that respective sample mean given the degrees of freedom (Whitney, 2002).  The 2 
tailed p-values will establish whether the sample means are statistically different at a 90% 
confidence interval.  Meaning that any p-values < 0.10 are statistically significant, and result in a 
rejection of the null hypothesis.  The methods used will be further explained in chapter 3.    
Current Commodity Programs 
All of the calculations for the ARC and PLC programs will be done based on the provisions of 
the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2018 (2018 farm bill) text.  It should be noted, 
however, that some discrepancies may exist between the current interpretation of the 2018 farm 
bill text, and the final regulations for the bill which are not yet public information.  Specific 
changes to the programs in the 2018 farm bill that will effect ARC and PLC will be included in 
the model.  One of the major assumptions used in scoring is that the baseline is developed 
assuming the programs being scored will retain their current provisions for the next 10 years.  
Therefore, CBO baselines are for 10 years into the future even though farm bills generally only 
last 5 years.   
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 The ARC calculations for the state based model present a unique challenge with regard to 
the projected yields.  The FAPRI yields that will be used to calculate the ARC variations in the 
national model are a national average yield.  However, FAPRI does not project an average state 
yield.  The use of this information will be further explained in Chapter III, but it is important to 
note here that a method of Correlation Induction will be used in the state based model to assign a 
state yield to each iteration that has the appropriate relationship respective to the iteration’s 
national price and national yield.  Evidence that the correlation induction process can be a viable 
one was found in research by Avramidis and Wilson, as well as Tew and Wilson.  In this study, 
the induction of future state yields aligns most clearly with Tew’s statement that this 
methodology may be used when seeking the prediction of future responses in a real system.  
Although the steps taken to achieve induced correlation in this study, as depicted in Chapter III, 
are slightly different than those laid out in the articles above, the foundation and intent are very 
similar.   
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will develop estimates of future Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss 
Coverage (PLC) program payments that make up the crop support portion of the commodity 
title, or Title I of the most recent farm bill.  The estimates will then be compared to the CBO 
Baseline to determine the accuracy of the models.  Both programs were created in the 2014 farm 
bill, and were amended slightly in the 2018 farm bill.  These programs are dependent on 
commodity specific annual information such as crop yields among other variables.  They are 
both briefly described below as they are administered. 
Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) 
ARC is a revenue based support program that develops a benchmark revenue using the previous 
5-year Olympic average of market prices and county yields and provides a payment when the 
annual revenue (market price * county yield) is below the benchmark for that year.  The specific 
variables and equations are below: 
Variables: 
BMY: Benchmark Yield is the 5-year Olympic average yield.  The average of the previous 5 
years of county yields after dropping the maximum and minimum. 
BMP: Benchmark Price is the 5-year Olympic average price.  The average of the previous 5 
years of market prices after dropping the maximum and minimum.   
BMR: Benchmark Revenue is the product of BMY and BMP and is unique for each county 
Payment Factor: 0.85 based on current legislation 
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ARC Payment Rate: Per acre payment for Base Acres enrolled in the ARC Program.  The ARC 
Payment Rate is limited to the 10% of the BMR.  Payment is only made when this figure is 
positive.  
Enrollment Proportion: Percentage of base acres in that particular crop enrolling in ARC. This 
number is reported in the CBO baseline.  
Total ARC Payment: ARC Payments made nationally for that particular crop. 
 
𝐵𝑀𝑌2018  = Olympic Average County Yield 2013 − 2017 
𝐵𝑀𝑃2018  = Olympic Average National MYA Prices 2013 − 2017 
𝐵𝑀𝑅2018  = 𝐵𝑀𝑃2018 ∗ 𝐵𝑀𝑃2018  
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒 =  𝐵𝑀𝑅2018 ∗ 0.86  
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑2018 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑌𝐴 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒2018  
𝐴𝑅𝐶 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = (𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 − 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝐺𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒)  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑅𝐶 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝐶 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗ 0.85 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
Price Loss Coverage (PLC) 
PLC provides price protection by providing a payment if the market price drops below the 
commodity specific reference price.  The quantity of the payment is dependent on producer 
payment yields for each farm as opposed to the ARC payment being based on county average 
yields. 
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PY = Payment Yield; designated yield per base acre established based on historical production. 
Unique based on information from each FSA farm number.  
MYA = Marketing Year Average national price as determined by NASS 
RP = Reference Price; established price for each covered commodity that determines price 
support level.  
Payment Factor: 0.85 based on current legislation 
PLC Payment Rate: Only paid if MYA price falls below the reference price. 
Enrollment Proportion: Percentage of base acres in that particular crop enrolling in ARC. This 
Number is reported from the CBO baseline.  
Total PLC Payment: PLC payments made nationally for that particular crop 
𝑃𝐿𝐶 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒2018  =  (𝑅𝑃2018  −  𝑀𝑌𝐴 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒2018) ∗ 𝑃𝑌 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝐿𝐶 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2018  
=  𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝐿𝐶 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒2018 ∗ 0.85 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
These programs are based on county (ARC) or individual (PLC) information.  However, 
this study will estimate payments in an aggregated fashion based on state and national 
parameters.  In order to score the programs into the future, projections of this information must 
be used within the model.  When CBO publishes a scoring report their results are presented 
deterministically as point estimates.  Evaluation of risk is accounted for in CBO’s forecasted 
scores, but their methodology is not made public. This project will use current support program 
parameters based on the formulas above and risk to create a scoring model designed to mimic 
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that of the CBO.  The intention being to provide an estimate that would be as close as possible to 
CBO’s value.  This scoring model will analyze major current agricultural support programs by 
producing national outlays for 9 major commodities: corn, wheat, soybeans, cotton, peanuts, 
sorghum, long grain rice, medium and short grain rice, and temperate japonica rice from 2018 - 
2028.  The model will emulate the methodology the CBO uses when possible, understanding that 
the distributions on price and yield projections are not known.  The shapes and scales of these 
distributions are the only portion of CBO’s model that cannot be duplicated.     
Recent Program Description 
For the calculation of Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) 
payments for each crop, the model incorporates provisions of the 2018 farm bill with only minor 
changes from the 2014 programs as described by Richardson, Outlaw, and Raulston.  Additional 
minor changes made in the 2018 farm bill are as follows.  First, scaling reference prices enable 
the reference prices used in the PLC and ARC programs to be raised up to 15% when 85% of the 
Olympic Average of the MYA price over the last 5 years is greater than the established reference 
price for that commodity.  The formula for this change is written below: 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒2019 =  0.85 ∗ (𝑂𝑙𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑐 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑌𝐴 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 2014 −
2018)  
 Second, there are new loan rates for many of the major covered commodities. These loan 
rates are fixed over the life of the bill as opposed to the reference prices.  Likely the most 
significant change between the 2014 and 2018 farm bills with regard to the ARC and PLC 
programs was the re-incorporation of upland cotton as a covered commodity under the 
commodity title as seed cotton (H.R. 2).  The seed cotton program structure was developed and 
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passed into law in February 2018 through the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.  The legislation 
describes seed cotton as the weighted average of cottonseed and cotton lint on a per pound basis. 
The MYA price of seed cotton is the MYA price of cottonseed and the MYA price of upland 
cotton lint weighted by each of their national production respectively. 
𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑌𝐴 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 2019
=  (𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑.  ∗  𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑌𝐴 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑.  
∗ 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑌𝐴 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)/ (𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑. + 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑. ) 
In the formula, cotton lint and cottonseed are both to be measured in pounds. This study 
calculated expected payments on upland cotton as a crop based on this recently established 
program.  
Nationally Based Scoring Model 
Commodity payments are, in practice, paid to tens of thousands of individuals each with their 
own specific program parameters.  However, the CBO estimates of expected national payments 
for ARC and PLC each year are based on one equation for ARC and one equation for PLC using 
aggregated information for the nation.  The same methodology will be used for the national scale 
model in this study.  Aggregation of payment yield data in the case of PLC, and actual yield data 
in the case of ARC are intended to achieve the following motives: make the model concise 
enough to be run in Microsoft Excel, have the ability to analyze payments for 9 major crops at 
once, and mimic the methodology used by CBO.   
Utilizing Risk in Projections 
Historical national prices and yields used in the model will be obtained from the National 
Agricultural Statistic Service (NASS) for 2011 - 2017.  For the years 2018 – 2028, the current 
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research will use the Food and Agriculture Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) projections of 500 
random draws for prices and yields.  FAPRI projections are frequently used in conjunction with 
USDA forecasts as an alternative estimate for Congress (U.S. Baseline Outlook).  The FAPRI 
projections are established as 500 random draws around the mean for each price and yield value 
in each year.  The values are developed according to the variability of each commodity applied 
via their large structural model.  Each of their 500 iterations of price and yield are associated 
with a given run of their model, so matched pairs of a price draw and a US yield draw 
automatically reflect their joint distribution as modelled by FAPRI.    
The nationally aggregated payment projections will also be adapted to the CBO means 
reported in the 2019 CBO Baseline because the objective is to create projections that mimic 
CBO.  However, since the CBO reports a single point estimate for the future prices and yields for 
each commodity, the risk associated with the 500 random draws from FAPRI will be assumed as 
the risk around the CBO mean estimates.  The model will then provide the ability to determine 
the scores based on the FAPRI or CBO mean projections considering risk.  The results for this 
study will all be in terms of the CBO means in accordance with the project objectives.  Ideally 
the model would use the exact draws that CBO uses to assign risk to their projections, but that 
information is not available, so using FAPRI risk is the next best available alternative.    
Limitations 
This national scale payment method will provide a national payment estimate, but national 
models have no ability to reflect the differences in regional yields or regional program history 
factors.  For example, for a given realized price and yield, the US ARC model may be close to 
having a payment trigged, but not quite. However, in such a situation a non-trivial number of 
producers are likely to be receiving payments.  
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State Based Scoring Model 
This study will also evaluate the outlays for ARC and PLC using state level aggregation in order 
to address the objective of determining an alternative method to predict program outlays.  This 
effort should overcome at least some portion of the aggregation issues described above.  This 
assumption is sound because regional yield variability will be taken into account.  A state-based 
analysis should also prove to be invaluable in further research because lawmakers will be able to 
understand how a policy change would directly affect their respective state.  
States Included 
A major limitation to this study is the size of the models because the more disaggregated the 
model, the larger the model becomes.  Therefore, for the state level analysis, only the major 
producing states for each commodity will have specific program payment projections, and the 
remaining states will have their base acres summed creating an “other states” payment.  The 
“other states” differ for each crop.  For corn and soybeans, the top eight states in corn and 
soybean base acres respectively are included, followed by Texas, and then “other states.”  Texas 
is intentionally included individually because the project is being done in Texas, even though it 
is not actually the ninth highest in corn or soybean base acres.  Peanut and rice base acres are 
both only found in a handful of states because of the unique growing conditions they require.  
The table below shows the states that are included and those that make up the “others states” for 
each crop. 
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Figure 3.1:  States Included in the State-Based Model 
 
Program Assumptions 
Given that PLC payment yields are not publicly available by state, the PLC payment yields for 
each county will be weighted depending on their respective base acres for that commodity, to 
create state-level payment yields.  For the “other states” category for each commodity, the PLC 
yields will be will be weighted on each state’s weighted average payment yield, and their 
respective total base acres. The payment yields, the FAPRI 500 MYA price draws for 2018 – 
Corn Soybeans Wheat Cotton Peanuts Sorghum Long Grain Rice Med and Short Grain Rice
1 IOWA                          ILLINOIS                      KANSAS                        CALIFORNIA                    GEORGIA                       KANSAS                        ARKANSAS                      ARKANSAS                      
2 ILLINOIS                      IOWA                          NORTH DAKOTA                  MISSISSIPPI                   TEXAS                         TEXAS                         LOUISIANA                     LOUISIANA                     
3 NEBRASKA                      MINNESOTA                     MONTANA                       GEORGIA                       ALABAMA                       NEBRASKA                      TEXAS                         TEXAS                         
4 MINNESOTA                     NORTH DAKOTA                  OKLAHOMA                      CALIFORNIA                    NORTH CAROLINA                MISSOURI                      MISSISSIPPI                   MISSOURI                      
5 INDIANA                       SOUTH DAKOTA                  TEXAS                         ARKANSAS                      FLORIDA                       OKLAHOMA                      MISSOURI                      MISSISSIPPI                   
6 SOUTH DAKOTA                  INDIANA                       COLORADO                      LOUISIANA                     OKLAHOMA                      NEW MEXICO                    CALIFORNIA                    * CALIFORNIA            
7 KANSAS                        MISSOURI                      WASHINGTON                    NORTH CAROLINA                SOUTH CAROLINA                COLORADO                      
8 WISCONSIN                     OHIO                          SOUTH DAKOTA                  TENNESSEE                     VIRGINIA                      ARKANSAS                      
9 TEXAS                         TEXAS                         NEBRASKA                      ALABAMA                       OTHER STATES SOUTH DAKOTA                  
10 OTHER STATES OTHER STATES OTHER STATES OTHER STATES OTHER STATES
11 OHIO                          NEBRASKA                      MINNESOTA                     OKLAHOMA                      NEW MEXICO                    LOUISIANA                     FLORIDA                       * Temperate Japonica
12 MISSOURI                      KANSAS                        IDAHO                         ARIZONA                       MISSISSIPPI                   MISSISSIPPI                   OKLAHOMA                      
13 NORTH DAKOTA                  ARKANSAS                      MISSOURI                      MISSOURI                      ARKANSAS                      ILLINOIS                      TENNESSEE                     
14 MICHIGAN                      MICHIGAN                      OREGON                        SOUTH CAROLINA                TENNESSEE                     GEORGIA                       ILLINOIS                      
15 KENTUCKY                      NORTH CAROLINA                ILLINOIS                      FLORIDA                       LOUISIANA                     TENNESSEE                     KENTUCKY                      
16 COLORADO                      MISSISSIPPI                   ARKANSAS                      NEW MEXICO                    ARIZONA                       ALABAMA                       SOUTH CAROLINA                
17 NEW YORK                      KENTUCKY                      OHIO                          VIRGINIA                      CALIFORNIA                    NORTH CAROLINA                ALABAMA                       
18 NORTH CAROLINA                WISCONSIN                     CALIFORNIA                    KANSAS                        MISSOURI                      KENTUCKY                      
19 PENNSYLVANIA                  TENNESSEE                     MICHIGAN                      MARYLAND                      COLORADO                      SOUTH CAROLINA                
20 TENNESSEE                     LOUISIANA                     NORTH CAROLINA                KENTUCKY                      NEBRASKA                      CALIFORNIA                    
21 VIRGINIA                      MARYLAND                      NEW MEXICO                    NEBRASKA                      ARIZONA                       
22 MARYLAND                      VIRGINIA                      INDIANA                       FLORIDA                       
23 CALIFORNIA                    SOUTH CAROLINA                KENTUCKY                      VIRGINIA                      
24 SOUTH CAROLINA                PENNSYLVANIA                  GEORGIA                       MARYLAND                      
25 GEORGIA                       OKLAHOMA                      TENNESSEE                     INDIANA                       
26 MISSISSIPPI                   ALABAMA                       WYOMING                       IOWA                          
27 LOUISIANA                     DELAWARE                      MISSISSIPPI                   PENNSYLVANIA                  
28 OKLAHOMA                      GEORGIA                       SOUTH CAROLINA                NORTH DAKOTA                  
29 ALABAMA                       NEW YORK                      UTAH                          DELAWARE                      
30 IDAHO                         NEW JERSEY                    VIRGINIA                      UTAH                          
31 ARKANSAS                      WEST VIRGINIA                 ALABAMA                       NEW JERSEY                    
32 WASHINGTON                    FLORIDA                       LOUISIANA                     MONTANA                       
33 DELAWARE                      COLORADO                      MARYLAND                      OHIO                          
34 NEW MEXICO                    MONTANA                       WISCONSIN                     IDAHO                         
35 WYOMING                       MAINE                         ARIZONA                       WISCONSIN                     
36 FLORIDA                       VERMONT                       PENNSYLVANIA                  OREGON                        
37 MONTANA                       WASHINGTON                    NEW YORK                      WEST VIRGINIA                 
38 NEW JERSEY                    OREGON                        IOWA                          MICHIGAN                      
39 VERMONT                       MASSACHUSETTS                 DELAWARE                      MINNESOTA                     
40 WEST VIRGINIA                 NEW MEXICO                    NEVADA                        WYOMING                       
41 OREGON                        CALIFORNIA                    FLORIDA                       NEVADA                        
42 UTAH                          ARIZONA                       NEW JERSEY                    NEW YORK                      
43 ARIZONA                       UTAH                          WEST VIRGINIA                 WASHINGTON                    
44 MAINE                         WYOMING                       MAINE                         VERMONT                       
45 CONNECTICUT                   IDAHO                         VERMONT                       CONNECTICUT                   
46 MASSACHUSETTS                 CONNECTICUT                   ALASKA                        NEW HAMPSHIRE                 
47 NEW HAMPSHIRE                 NEW HAMPSHIRE                 CONNECTICUT                   MASSACHUSETTS                 
48 NEVADA                        MASSACHUSETTS                 RHODE ISLAND                  
49 RHODE ISLAND                  MAINE                         
50
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2027, and the base acreages for each state, are all that is needed to generate the state level PLC 
payments. 
 The amount of base acres of each commodity in each county was last reported by FSA 
for the 2014 crop year.  The base acres listed in this report do not match the amount of base used 
by CBO in the baseline.  This can be explained by the fact the 100% of existing base acres are 
not enrolled in farm programs each year.  This study will simply take the percentage of base 
acres of each crop in each state and apply that to the amount of total base acres reported for that 
crop in the CBO Baseline.  For example, if Texas had 9% of the wheat base in the 2014 crop 
year according to FSA, then that 9% will be multiplied by the total wheat base in the CBO 
baseline to obtain an estimate of Texas wheat base. 
In order to calculate a state based ARC payment, the MYA price will also use the FAPRI 
500 draws for MYA price from 2018 – 2028.  FAPRI, however, does not provide state-level 
average yield predictions.  Thus, the yields that are yet to be realized (2019 – 2027) will be 
simulated for each state that is to be included in accordance to the table above.  The historic 
yields used for the “other states” will be simulated by taking a weighted average of the historical 
production from the states.  The ‘weight’ of each state will then be applied to the historical 
planted acre yields to create an entry that encompasses all of the states that cannot be modeled 
individually.  Note that payment projections will be calculated for the “other states” just as they 
will be for the states that are included individually.  
Correlation Induction for Yield Projections 
The methods below explain the calculation of 500 unique state yields for 2019 - 2027 based on 
each state’s historical yield, the correlations among them, and their correlations with the national 
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historic price and national historic yield deviates.  The historic yields and prices will be obtained 
from NASS.  For each year, stochastic draws are needed for J state yield deviates.  These must 
be correlated with the US average yield and change in the natural logarithm of the market price, 
which are pre-drawn (i.e., they are from FAPRI). A general approach to inducing correlation 
among some pre-drawn random variables and some newly simulated variables is described 
below.  
 A covariance matrix from the historic yield deviates and historic log changes in price for 
each state will be calculated.  The optimal level of shrinkage to use was found based on Ledoit’s 
methods (Ledoit, 2003).  The resulting covariance matrix is then decomposed based on the 
Cholesky Decomposition method.  
Suppose K is the total number of variables in the system, J is the total number of 
variables to be drawn, K – J is the total number of pre-drawn variables, N is the total number of 
observations, while also noting that J ≥ K / 2.  Also suppose C represents the Scaled, Correlated 
Variables, L represents the Cholesky Decomposition of the covariance matrix described in the 
previous paragraph (Lower Triangular), and that Z represents the Standard Normal Variables. 
(1)  𝑪  =   𝑳 𝒁 
Then, scaled correlated variables are calculated from independent standard normal 
variables using the following relationship.  We can write (1) in terms of partitioned 
matrices as follows.  
𝒁 = [
𝒁𝟏
𝒁𝟐
]      𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐾 𝑥 𝑁)          
𝒁𝟏  𝑖𝑠  𝐽 𝑥 𝑁
𝒁𝟐  𝑖𝑠  (𝐾 − 𝐽) 𝑥 𝑁
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𝑪 = [
𝑪𝟏
𝑪𝟐
]       𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐾 𝑥 𝑁)  
𝑪𝟏 =  𝐽 𝑥 𝑁
𝑪𝟐  =   (𝐾 − 𝐽) 𝑥 𝑁
    
𝑳 = [
𝑳𝟏𝟏 𝑳𝟏𝟐
𝑳𝟐𝟏 𝑳𝟐𝟐
] 
Note:  L12 = 0 
The partitions of L have the following dimensions: 
L11    J x J 
L12   J x (K – J) 
L21   (K – J) x J 
L22   (K – J) x (K – J) 
Then, the correlation induction process is as follows. 
(2):  𝒁𝟏  =   𝑳𝟏𝟏
−𝟏 𝑪𝟏 
Draw Z2 
(3):  𝑪𝟐   =   𝑳𝟐𝟏 𝒁𝟏  +  𝑳𝟐𝟐 𝒁𝟐 
Once the Cholesky decomposition L is found, the “top” of the system is used to solve for Z1, 
given the pre-drawn realizations contained in C1 (2).  Then, after drawing independent standard 
normal draws (Z2), the values for the non-pre-drawn variables (C2) are calculated using equation 
(3).   
The correlations found for each state using this correlation induction methodology will be 
applied to create 500 unique state yield draws for each state for each projected year.  The matrix 
operations, along with the generation of standard normal variables (Z) that are drawn in the 
formulas above will be calculated in an add-in to Microsoft Excel called Simetar (Richardson, et 
al.).  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Results from both the national and state-based models are discussed in this chapter. The national 
model is discussed first, providing a comprehensive look at the likelihood, and amount of an 
ARC or PLC Payments for each crop in each year. In addition, the scores from this study will be 
compared to those provided by the 2019 CBO Baseline.   
National Model Results 
The results are first shown based on average expected payments per year by crop and compared 
with the expected payments reported by CBO in the 2019 CBO Baseline report. The results for 
the crops are listed below and are organized based on fiscal year (FY) as opposed to crop year.  
This distinction is important because, in practice the 2016 - 2017 MYA price is based on the crop 
that is harvested in the fall of 2016.  However, because of the schedules of ARC and PLC 
payments, those made from the parameters above are to be reported on FY2018.  It is also 
important to note that the data from FY 18 and FY 19 is already established, and therefore has no 
uncertainty in the model.  Table 4.1 is simply the January 2019 CBO baseline score for ARC and 
PLC for those same commodities. Table 4.2 includes the mean payments for each commodity in 
the national model, and Table 4.3 shows the difference in the scores from the national model and 
the CBO baseline.  The basic formula for the differences calculated for the national and state 
models is below. 
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) − (2019 𝐶𝐵𝑂 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
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Table 4.1:  2019 CBO Baseline Means
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
Corn
PLC 265 270 169 2110 1706 1900 1859 1920 2053 2172 2608 2353
ARC 2917 1226 581 114 94 126 138 153 173 191 214 189
Subtotal 3182 1496 750 2224 1799 2026 1997 2073 2227 2363 2822 2542
Soybeans
PLC 10 11 14 547 328 282 261 225 155 178 149 151
ARC 606 672 420 236 120 111 96 80 54 70 67 79
Subtotal 616 683 434 783 448 392 357 305 208 248 216 229
Wheat
PLC 1369 718 372 728 702 702 705 689 721 689 683 711
ARC 511 423 209 65 67 73 53 59 55 61 65 72
Subtotal 1880 1140 581 793 769 775 758 748 776 751 747 784
Seed Cotton
PLC ---   ---   213 573 514 446 392 337 308 281 261 250
ARC ---   ---   44 15 19 19 16 14 16 15 14 15
Subtotal ---   ---   257 589 533 465 408 351 324 296 275 265
Peanuts
PLC 607 414 417 388 412 412 406 406 415 425 432 446
ARC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subtotal 608 414 417 388 412 413 406 406 415 426 433 447
Sorghum
PLC 383 246 179 232 157 147 146 148 146 148 148 149
ARC 24 23 24 19 14 11 9 9 8 9 9 9
Subtotal 407 269 203 251 171 158 156 157 154 157 156 158
Rice
PLC 1032 515 776 764 746 724 704 691 674 664 650 642
ARC 22 7 10 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 3
Subtotal 1054 522 786 767 749 727 706 693 677 666 653 645
Totals
PLC 3666 2174 2140 5341 4564 4613 4473 4416 4472 4557 4931 4702
ARC 4081 2351 1287 452 317 342 315 318 309 348 371 367
Subtotal 7747 4524 3427 5794 4881 4955 4788 4733 4781 4906 5302 5068
Note: CBO reports all rice together.  All figures are in terms of $1,000,000's. 
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Table 4.2: National Model Mean Projections -  Unadjusted 
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
Corn
PLC 209 210 64 1896 1963 2482 2341 2366 2575 2880 3204 3057
ARC 3906 0 0 47 48 84 79 101 146 173 196 191
Subtotal 4116 210 64 1943 2011 2566 2420 2467 2721 3052 3400 3248
Soybeans
PLC 0 0 2 727 548 515 530 447 397 436 468 462
ARC 0 0 0 210 122 112 97 73 80 102 125 126
Subtotal 0 0 2 937 670 627 627 521 477 538 593 589
Wheat
PLC 1378 667 344 936 1022 1074 1051 1009 1017 1039 1033 1057
ARC 735 593 0 9 20 21 31 37 40 48 45 46
Subtotal 2113 1260 344 946 1042 1095 1082 1046 1057 1088 1077 1103
Seed Cotton
PLC --- --- 207 883 849 778 733 657 579 594 560 546
ARC --- --- 56 32 49 46 37 28 29 31 28 29
Subtotal --- --- 263 915 898 823 770 685 608 626 588 576
Peanuts
PLC 597 348 439 433 424 417 417 413 415 419 432 442
ARC 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subtotal 599 348 439 433 424 417 418 413 416 420 433 442
Sorghum
PLC 338 213 193 279 213 218 208 210 212 212 217 216
ARC 11 9 26 21 15 14 11 11 12 13 13 14
Subtotal 350 222 220 300 228 231 220 222 224 225 230 230
Rice
PLC - LG Rice 947 539 687 697 680 621 581 543 530 523 521 519
PLC - MGSG Rice 35 21 18 24 23 24 24 25 23 23 22 21
PLC - TJ Rice 84 0 0 75 52 77 87 97 88 86 73 67
ARC - LG Rice 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
ARC - MGSG Rice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ARC - TJ Rice 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subtotal 1071 563 707 798 756 723 693 666 643 634 617 608
Totals
PLC 3589 1998 1954 5948 5773 6205 5972 5767 5837 6213 6530 6387
ARC 4660 625 103 420 331 378 368 374 421 478 502 496
Total 8248 2623 2056 6368 6104 6583 6340 6140 6258 6690 7032 6882
Note: Fiscal year 2018 corresponds with crop year 2016. Seed Cotton was not covered until FY 20.
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The purpose of this project was to match the score from the model as close to the 2019 
CBO Baseline as possible.  To address this, the amount of risk applied to the CBO means, based 
on the draws from FAPRI, were multiplied by a Risk Adjustment Factor (RAF).  This will 
reduce the differences between projected PLC payments for the national model and the CBO 
Baseline.  The RAFs were applied directly to the percent deviate of each FAPRI draw of 
Table 4.3:  National Model Differences -  Unadjusted
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
Corn
PLC -56 -60 -106 -214 257 582 483 445 522 707 596 705
ARC 990 -1226 -581 -67 -45 -42 -59 -52 -27 -18 -18 2
Subtotal 934 -1286 -686 -281 212 539 423 394 494 689 578 706
Soybeans
PLC -10 -11 -12 180 220 233 269 222 242 258 319 311
ARC -606 -672 -420 -26 2 2 1 -7 26 33 58 48
Subtotal -616 -683 -432 154 221 235 270 216 269 291 377 359
Wheat
PLC 9 -51 -27 208 320 372 346 320 296 350 350 345
ARC 223 170 -209 -55 -47 -53 -22 -22 -15 -13 -20 -26
Subtotal 233 119 -236 153 273 320 323 298 281 337 330 320
Seed Cotton
PLC ---   ---   -7 310 335 332 340 320 271 314 299 296
ARC ---   ---   12 16 30 27 22 14 14 16 14 14
Subtotal ---   ---   6 326 365 359 362 334 285 330 313 311
Peanuts
PLC -10 -66 22 45 12 5 11 6 0 -6 0 -4
ARC 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subtotal -8 -66 22 45 12 5 11 6 0 -6 0 -4
Sorghum
PLC -45 -33 14 46 57 71 62 63 67 64 69 67
ARC -13 -13 3 2 1 3 2 2 4 4 4 5
Subtotal -57 -46 17 49 58 74 64 65 70 68 73 72
Rice
PLC 34 45 -72 32 8 -3 -12 -26 -33 -32 -35 -36
ARC -17 -5 -8 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Subtotal 16 41 -79 31 8 -4 -13 -27 -34 -33 -36 -37
Totals
PLC -78 -176 -180 297 874 1260 1158 1030 1094 1341 1300 1389
ARC 578 -1746 -1214 -147 -90 -91 -79 -79 -12 5 23 28
Subtotal 501 -1922 -1395 150 784 1169 1079 952 1081 1347 1323 1416
Note:  Difference = (Natl. model) - (CBO Baseline).  All scores are in terms of $1,000,000's. 
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projected prices.  The adjusted percent deviates were then applied to the CBO mean prices to 
create 500 unique draws for each projected year (2018 – 2027).  
The fact that the ARC program depends on both price and yield variability, causes the 
scores for ARC to be more difficult to mimic.  Meaning, the aggregated ARC scores are far less 
likely to match than the PLC scores.  Assuming that CBO is using all of their own parameters for 
total base acres, average MYA price, payment yield, and ARC/PLC enrollment percentage, the 
only factors effecting PLC payments that can be different between the CBO Baseline and this 
model are the shape, and scale of the distribution of MYA prices. 
In Table 4.3, corn has a positive difference on PLC in FY 21, or the national model has a 
larger payment projection than CBO.  Thus, an RAF < 1 was applied to the percent deviates in 
that fiscal year in order to shrink this difference until the model scores the average national PLC 
payment within roughly $1 million of the CBO estimate for PLC in FY 22.  This process is the 
best way to produce scores as close as possible to the CBO baseline without having access to 
their exact distribution of MYA projected prices.  As seen below, each year from FY 20 – FY 29 
was adjusted for each crop because they have differing price distributions, thus, they require a 
different RAF.  As a reminder FY 18 and FY 19 were not scaled because their respective prices 
and yields are already established.  
 
Table 4.4:  National Model Risk Adjustment Factors
FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
Corn 8.25 1.1 0.901 0.7953 0.813 0.836 0.819 0.7585 0.796 0.7559
Soybeans 3 0.675 0.645 0.635 0.5875 0.65 0.62 0.61 0.555 0.5775
Wheat 7 0.55 0.45 0.415 0.43 0.445 0.512 0.433 0.43 0.453
Seed Cotton 1.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.08 0.26 0.305 0.36 0.395
Peanuts 5.75 0.5 0.87 0.945 0.885 0.945 1 1.08 1 1.07
Sorghum 4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Rice 1 2.2 1.3 2.2 2.28 2.63 2.335 2.27 2.02 1.72
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 The tables that are referred to as “adjusted” are labeled in that way to indicate that their 
respective RAF has been applied.  Below in Figure 4.1 is the probability density function (PDF) 
of fiscal year 2021 corn prices depicting the price distributions, unadjusted and adjusted.  
 
Table 4.5 on the following page shows the difference in the RAF based projections from the 
national model, and the CBO baseline.  
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After the RAFs were introduced, the national level model results for PLC were much 
closer to the CBO Baseline, as shown above.  Note that only the projections (FY 20 – FY 29) 
shifted because the FY 18 and FY 19 are both established years that do not contain any risk.  
There were differences in projected PLC scores in Table 4.5 for cotton, peanuts, sorghum, and 
rice that did not squeeze closer to zero as their respective RAF was adjusted.  Barring some 
specific adjustment by CBO to these particular projections that is not reported, the reason the 
Table 4.5:  National Model Differences -  Adjusted
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
Corn
PLC -56 -60 1 -6 0 -1 1 0 -1 -1 0 0
ARC 990 -1226 -135 -46 -58 -76 -86 -84 -82 -95 -91 -80
Subtotal 934 -1286 -134 -52 -58 -77 -85 -84 -83 -96 -92 -80
Soybeans
PLC -10 -11 -1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 -1 0
ARC -606 -672 -266 -106 -73 -71 -80 -65 -44 -57 -52 -60
Subtotal -616 -683 -267 -106 -73 -70 -80 -64 -44 -56 -53 -61
Wheat
PLC 9 -51 0 -1 -1 1 1 -1 0 0 0 -1
ARC 223 170 -208 -64 -66 -73 -52 -55 -47 -57 -62 -66
Subtotal 233 119 -208 -65 -67 -72 -52 -56 -47 -58 -62 -66
Seed Cotton
PLC ---   ---   0 281 215 163 113 50 0 0 0 1
ARC ---   ---   12 -7 10 5 -9 -11 -11 -12 -11 -11
Subtotal ---   ---   12 274 224 168 104 38 -11 -12 -11 -10
Peanuts
PLC -10 -66 0 24 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
ARC 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subtotal -8 -66 0 24 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Sorghum
PLC -45 -33 15 21 10 15 11 10 13 9 14 13
ARC -13 -13 6 2 -2 -2 -2 -3 -2 -2 -2 -2
Subtotal -57 -46 21 23 8 13 8 7 11 7 12 12
Rice
PLC 34 45 -72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ARC -17 -5 -8 -1 -1 0 -1 0 0 -1 -1 -1
Subtotal 16 41 -79 -2 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 0
Totals
PLC -78 -176 -57 37 11 17 13 10 13 8 12 13
ARC 578 -1746 -610 -215 -200 -222 -221 -208 -175 -211 -208 -208
Subtotal 501 -1922 -667 -177 -189 -205 -208 -197 -163 -203 -195 -196
Note:  Difference = (Natl. model) - (CBO Baseline).  CBO reports all rice together.  All figures are in terms of $1,000,000's. 
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scores will not all match is due to the shape of their respective price distributions.  The scale of 
the distribution is what was adjusted with the RAF’s but the shape cannot be addressed because 
it is not public information. Therefore, nothing else can be done to make the scores match more 
closely without having the exact price distributions that CBO used in their model.  
As introduced in Chapter II, p-values from the t-statistics based on the hypothesis that the 
projected mean from the model equals the CBO baseline mean, are reported to show how well 
the national model mimicked the CBO baseline.  A 90% confidence interval was used to 
establish which projections differ enough from CBO to reject the hypothesis.  Table 4.6 will 
shade the instances where the p-value is greater than 0.10. The shaded values are not 
significantly different than the CBO Baseline projection.  The shading helps to see that the 
RAF’s caused the model projections to no longer be significantly different than the CBO 
Baseline projections.    
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Table 4.6 :  National Model P-Values from One Sample T-test
FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
Corn
PLC P-Value - Unadj. 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PLC P-Value - Adj. 0.89 0.96 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
ARC P-Value - Unadj. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.19 0.21 0.92
ARC P-Value - Adj. 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Soybeans
PLC P-Value - Unadj. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PLC P-Value - Adj. 0.43 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.99
ARC P-Value - Unadj. 0.05 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.44 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
ARC P-Value - Adj. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wheat
PLC P-Value - Unadj. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PLC P-Value - Adj. 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98
ARC P-Value - Unadj. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ARC P-Value - Adj. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Seed Cotton
PLC P-Value - Unadj. 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PLC P-Value - Adj. 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.93
ARC P-Value - Unadj.0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ARC P-Value - Adj. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Peanuts
PLC P-Value - Unadj. 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.68 0.35 0.60 0.97 0.63 1.00 0.73
PLC P-Value - Adj. 0.98 0.00 0.90 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.98
ARC P-Value - Unadj. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.56 0.08 0.02
ARC P-Value - Adj. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.07 0.08 0.00
Sorghum
PLC P-Value - Unadj. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PLC P-Value - Adj. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ARC P-Value - Unadj.0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ARC P-Value - Adj. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note:  FY 20 is empty where no ARC payment occurred in any iteration for that crop. 
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State Model Results 
 As opposed to the previous model, the state model establishes a score for each of the 
most prominent states and an all other for each crop (Table 4.7), and then these scores are 
summed by crop.  This enables the state based scoring method to be compared to the CBO 
Baseline.  Note the state model is less aggregated, allowing the scores to encompass more state-
level information.  In the PLC calculation, the payment per acre is based on a state level PLC 
payment yield, as opposed to using one for the entire country as the national model does.  As 
discussed in detail in Chapter III, ARC includes yield variability based on each states’ historical 
planted acre yield.  An example of the top 3 unadjusted state scores for corn are shown in Table 
4.7, but the entire collection of each crop score in each state can be found in the appendix. 
 
  
  
Table 4.7: State Model - Corn Calculated Means
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
IOWA  
PLC 43 43 13 388 358 452 427 431 469 525 584 557
ARC 212 0 0 31 27 34 32 34 37 40 42 42
ILLINOIS       
PLC 35 35 11 320 295 373 352 356 387 433 482 460
ARC 347 0 0 36 25 34 35 33 35 36 40 39
NEBRASKA   
PLC 29 29 9 260 240 304 286 289 315 352 392 374
ARC 635 0 0 9 7 10 12 17 19 19 22 20
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TABLE 4.8: State Model Mean Projections: Unadjusted 
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
CORN
Total PLC 249 249 76 2255 2084 2636 2486 2512 2734 3058 3402 3246
Total ARC 3406 190 89 172 135 174 175 189 209 223 248 239
Subtotal 3654 439 164 2427 2219 2809 2661 2701 2944 3281 3650 3485
SOYBEANS
Total PLC 0 0 2 763 575 540 556 470 417 458 492 485
Total ARC 0 78 5 249 167 150 133 106 101 134 138 152
Subtotal 0 78 7 1011 742 690 689 575 518 592 630 637
WHEAT
Total PLC 1385 670 344 925 1022 1079 1034 993 1001 1023 1017 1040
Total ARC 590 508 60 76 82 89 76 78 86 90 90 90
Subtotal 1975 1178 404 1001 1104 1167 1110 1072 1087 1113 1107 1130
SEEDCOTTON
Total PLC 0 0 237 1014 975 893 841 755 665 683 644 627
Total ARC 0 0 3 4 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 3
Subtotal 0 0 241 1018 979 897 844 757 667 685 646 630
PEANUTS
Total PLC 624 340 447 440 432 425 425 420 423 427 440 450
Total ARC 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Subtotal 626 341 448 441 433 426 426 421 424 428 442 451
SORGHUM
Total PLC 337 212 189 276 211 216 207 209 211 210 215 214
Total ARC 35 13 30 28 18 16 13 12 12 13 14 13
Subtotal 373 226 219 304 230 232 220 221 223 223 228 228
ALL RICE
Total PLC 1026 538 678 717 708 641 604 565 555 544 543 543
Total ARC 5 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Subtotal 1031 540 680 719 710 642 605 567 556 546 544 545
Note:  All Figures are in terms of $1,000,000's
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Unadjusted results for FY 20 – FY 29 were used to compare the national model with the state 
model results to determine which one more closely matched CBO.  The information in Figure 
4.2 indicates which model structure did a better job at mimicking CBO.  
TABLE 4.9:  State Model Differences:  Unadjusted
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
CORN
Total PLC -16 -21 -94 146 378 735 627 592 681 885 794 639
Total ARC 489 -1,036 -492 58 41 48 37 36 36 32 34 25
Subtotal 473 -1,057 -586 204 420 783 664 628 717 918 828 664
SOYBEANS
Total PLC -10 -11 -12 216 247 258 295 245 262 280 342 334
Total ARC -606 -594 -415 13 46 39 36 25 48 65 71 74
Subtotal -616 -605 -426 229 293 298 331 270 310 345 413 408
WHEAT
Total PLC 16 -48 -27 197 320 376 329 304 280 333 334 329
Total ARC 79 86 -149 12 15 15 23 19 31 28 25 18
Subtotal 94 38 -176 208 335 392 352 324 311 362 359 346
SEEDCOTTON
Total PLC ---   ---   24 441 461 447 449 418 357 402 383 377
Total ARC ---   ---   -41 -12 -16 -15 -13 -12 -13 -12 -12 -12
Subtotal 0 0 -17 429 445 432 436 406 344 390 371 365
PEANUTS
Total PLC 16 -74 30 53 20 12 19 14 8 1 8 4
Total ARC 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Subtotal 18 -73 31 53 21 13 20 15 9 3 9 5
SORGHUM
Total PLC -45 -34 10 44 55 69 60 61 65 62 67 66
Total ARC 11 -9 7 9 4 5 4 3 4 4 5 4
Subtotal -34 -43 16 53 59 74 64 64 69 66 72 70
ALL RICE
Total PLC -6 24 -99 -46 -38 -83 -100 -125 -119 -119 -107 -99
Total ARC -18 -5 -8 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Subtotal -24 19 -107 -48 -39 -85 -101 -126 -120 -120 -109 -100
Note:  All Figures are in terms of $1,000,000's
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Based on the above figure, the national model is closer to CBO, especially for PLC.  This 
conclusion makes sense given that CBO uses a nationally based model in their projections.   
RAFs were applied to the MYA price distribution using the same methods as the national 
model to shrink the difference between PLC scores produced by the state model, and the 2019 
CBO Baseline.  The adjusted results are reported below along with the RAF used for each year 
for each crop.  
 
Table 4.10:  State Model Risk Adjustment Factors
FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
Corn 6.5 0.9413 0.8632 0.7583 0.7763 0.8026 0.78 0.7159 0.7436 0.795
Soybeans 2.95 0.634 0.622 0.616 0.57 0.633 0.608 0.597 0.548 0.568
Wheat 7 0.58 0.472 0.433 0.448 0.467 0.533 0.452 0.448 0.472
Seed Cotton 1 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.23 0.2965 0.334
Peanuts 7 0.55 0.77 0.85 0.8 0.87 0.92 0.98 0.91 0.95
Sorghum 1 0.5 0.38 0.35 0.39 0.4 0.37 0.4 0.373 0.37
Rice 1 0.9 0.9 2.84 2.83 3.28 2.82 2.82 2.35 2.02
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The differences in the PLC scores are all adjusted to the point that they nearly all match 
the CBO scores in both the national model and the state model.  Thus, when comparing the 
models post-adjustment, the ARC scores and the subtotals indicate that the state model matches 
CBO more closely in terms of how much the state model differs in absolute value.   
Table 4.12 shows the p-values for the state model for each crop.  Shading was done in the 
same way as Table 4.6.  Similarly to Table 4.6, the state model RAF’s made many of the PLC 
scores shift from “reject”, to “fail to reject.”  This shift is beneficial because it means that the 
TABLE 4.11:  State Model Differences:  Adjusted
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
CORN
Total PLC -16 -21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total ARC 489 -1,036 -298 47 25 17 2 -1 -13 -31 -33 -27
Subtotal 473 -1,057 -299 47 25 17 3 -1 -14 -31 -32 -27
SOYBEANS
Total PLC -10 -11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total ARC -606 -594 -258 -44 -24 -20 -42 -42 -25 -27 -24 -33
Subtotal -616 -605 -259 -44 -25 -20 -42 -42 -25 -27 -24 -32
WHEAT
Total PLC 16 -48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total ARC 79 86 -82 -2 -9 -13 -7 -12 -1 -10 -16 -22
Subtotal 94 38 -82 -2 -9 -13 -7 -12 -1 -10 -16 -22
SEEDCOTTON
Total PLC ---   ---   24 409 325 257 189 108 5 0 0 0
Total ARC ---   ---   -41 -12 -17 -16 -14 -13 -14 -14 -13 -14
Subtotal 0 0 -17 397 308 241 175 95 -9 -14 -13 -14
PEANUTS
Total PLC 16 -74 0 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total ARC 2 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Subtotal 18 -73 1 33 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SORGHUM
Total PLC -45 -34 10 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total ARC 11 -9 7 10 3 3 2 0 0 0 1 1
Subtotal -34 -43 16 29 3 3 2 0 0 0 2 1
ALL RICE
Total PLC -6 24 -99 -49 -42 0 0 0 1 1 -1 0
Total ARC -18 -5 -8 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1
Subtotal -24 19 -107 -50 -43 -1 -1 0 0 0 -2 -1
Note:  All Figures are in terms of $1,000,000's
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RAF’s caused many of the scores from the state model to be closer to the CBO Baseline 
projections.  
 
Table 4.12 :  State Model P-Values from One Sample T-test
FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
Corn
PLC P-Value - Unadj. 0.000 0.276 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PLC P-Value - Adj. 0.985 0.981 0.984 0.975 0.974 0.975 0.976 0.970 0.989 0.975
ARC P-Value - Unadj. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.023 0.021 0.101
ARC P-Value - Adj. 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.112 0.811 0.900 0.284 0.010 0.010 0.044
Soybeans
PLC P-Value - Unadj. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PLC P-Value - Adj. 0.684 0.999 0.997 0.997 0.991 0.984 0.996 0.992 0.976 0.989
ARC P-Value - Unadj. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.036 0.331 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000
ARC P-Value - Adj. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000
Wheat
PLC P-Value - Unadj. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PLC P-Value - Adj. 0.971 0.998 0.998 0.989 1.000 0.993 0.991 0.999 0.996 0.995
ARC P-Value - Unadj. 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ARC P-Value - Adj. 0.000 0.386 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.717 0.000 0.000 0.000
Seed Cotton
PLC P-Value - Unadj. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PLC P-Value - Adj. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.456 0.981 0.988 0.995
ARC P-Value - Unadj. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ARC P-Value - Adj. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Peanuts
PLC P-Value - Unadj. 0.000 0.000 0.103 0.324 0.131 0.271 0.528 0.909 0.542 0.778
PLC P-Value - Adj. 0.995 0.000 0.972 0.993 0.982 0.973 0.996 0.990 0.993 0.984
ARC P-Value - Unadj. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ARC P-Value - Adj. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sorghum
PLC P-Value - Unadj. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PLC P-Value - Adj. 0.000 0.000 0.980 0.972 0.990 0.977 0.953 0.938 0.913 0.983
ARC P-Value - Unadj. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ARC P-Value - Adj. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.704 0.910 0.294 0.016 0.076
Note:  FY 20 is not empty for any crop because ARC payment occurred in at least one iteration for every crop. 
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The differences in the PLC scores are all adjusted to the point that they nearly all match 
the CBO scores in both the national model and the state model.  Thus, when comparing the 
models post-adjustment, the ARC scores and the subtotals determine that the state model 
matches CBO more closely in terms of how much the state model differs in absolute value.   
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Agricultural policy analysis requires timely and accurate research to maintain relevance.  
With ever-present budgetary pressure, and a population that continues to migrate away from the 
farm, tools like the ones developed in this study will be needed in the future to defend and 
improve the programs put in place to protect US producers.  Producers and their commodity 
organizations routinely provide policy suggestions prior to the development of each farm bill.  
Groups often have several suggestions for potential policy changes, however, without knowing 
the cost of their policy proposals they have no idea if such changes will be economically 
feasible.  If they ask for a change that is too expensive, it could be quickly dismissed once CBO 
scores the changes.  They may not have the opportunity to propose additional changes and, in 
essence, they have lost their chance to have a say in agricultural policy reform.  Therefore, this 
scoring tool can be used to assist producers, their associations and other interest groups with 
developing policy proposals that fit within budget guidelines.  This study, in particular, provides 
a holistic view of the major commodity programs and the projected expenditures on the main 
commodities produced across the country.  These major crops can also be tweaked individually 
to compare program parameter changes beyond the baseline results that were reported in Chapter 
IV. 
  The primary objective of the project was to create a stochastic simulation model that can 
be used to score ARC and PLC changes for 9 major agricultural commodities.  The model used 
many of the parameters and prices from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline so that 
estimates could be expected to approximate the CBO score of the same policy proposals.  This 
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analysis compared the CBO baseline projections with the results from two approaches to 
determine which method provides the most similar payment projections to the CBO baseline.   
 The first approach of this study was to project scores for the programs based on 
nationally averaged parameters.  The alternative to this approach was to base the program 
parameters for ARC and PLC on state averages for the states with the highest acres of each crop.  
The nationally based model was used because it is the understood practice of the CBO.  The state 
based model provided more specific yield variability and history across the analysis which could 
lead to a more useful model of expected payments.  Both approaches were compared to the 
January 2019 CBO Baseline to see which most closely matched CBO.  
The results in Chapter IV show that the unadjusted national model does a better job at 
mimicking CBO, especially for PLC.  This conclusion is based on the fact the national model 
had a smaller difference from the CBO projection more often than the state based model.  This 
makes sense because CBO uses a nationally based model in their projections.  
After the models where adjusted so that the PLC scores are all adjusted to the point that 
they nearly match the CBO scores, the ARC scores and the subtotals determine that the state 
model matches CBO more closely.   
Future Research 
Analytical tools in this field will continue to be vital in helping policy influencers have an 
educated understanding of any proposed policy changes into the future.  In terms of improving 
the results of the model, more knowledge of any wedges or unique factors used by the CBO 
would be beneficial when attempting to improve models.  
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Finally, the state based model could potentially be made more effective by increasing the 
number of states considered individually.  In this model, only 9 states were modeled separately 
and the remained states were weighted into an others states payment.  The reasoning behind this 
was to analyze the major states, while also considering the size of the model.  Even though the 
other states are accounted for the under ‘other states’ umbrella, the yield variability is dampened 
more than if they were factored in individually.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: State Model - Corn Calculated Means
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
IOWA  
PLC 43 43 13 388 358 452 427 431 469 525 584 557
ARC 212 0 0 31 27 34 32 34 37 40 42 42
ILLINOIS       
PLC 35 35 11 320 295 373 352 356 387 433 482 460
ARC 347 0 0 36 25 34 35 33 35 36 40 39
NEBRASKA   
PLC 29 29 9 260 240 304 286 289 315 352 392 374
ARC 635 0 0 9 7 10 12 17 19 19 22 20
MINNESOTA  
PLC 24 24 7 219 202 256 241 244 265 297 330 315
ARC 51 0 0 15 14 16 16 17 20 21 24 24
INDIANA  
PLC 17 17 5 155 143 181 171 173 188 210 234 223
ARC 335 0 0 12 8 10 13 13 14 14 16 15
SOUTH DAKOTA
PLC 13 13 4 116 107 135 128 129 140 157 175 167
ARC 129 87 0 11 8 10 9 10 11 12 14 14
KANSAS 
PLC 14 14 4 125 115 146 138 139 151 169 188 180
ARC 128 103 0 14 11 11 11 11 12 12 14 12
WISCONSIN 
PLC 10 10 3 91 84 106 100 101 110 123 137 131
ARC 91 0 0 6 6 8 7 8 9 10 11 10
TEXAS 
PLC 5 5 2 48 45 57 53 54 59 66 73 70
ARC 111 0 89 5 3 3 4 3 5 5 5 5
OTHER STATES
PLC 59 59 18 535 494 625 590 596 649 725 807 770
ARC 1367 0 0 33 25 37 38 43 48 54 60 59
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Table A.2: State Model - Soybean Calculated Means
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
ILLINOIS
PLC 0 0 0 112 85 80 82 69 61 67 72 72
ARC 0 0 0 35 25 24 22 17 14 20 20 23
IOWA
PLC 0 0 0 110 83 78 80 67 60 66 71 70
ARC 0 0 0 31 21 20 17 13 14 20 20 22
MINNESOTA
PLC 0 0 0 82 62 58 60 51 45 49 53 52
ARC 0 0 0 32 24 19 15 12 11 14 13 15
NORTH DAKOTA
PLC 0 0 0 45 34 32 32 27 24 27 29 28
ARC 0 0 0 15 11 11 9 8 7 9 9 9
SOUTH DAKOTA
PLC 0 0 0 49 37 35 36 30 27 29 31 31
ARC 0 38 0 18 13 10 8 6 6 8 8 9
INDIANA
PLC 0 0 0 59 45 42 43 36 32 35 38 38
ARC 0 0 0 23 13 12 11 9 8 11 11 12
MISSOURI
PLC 0 0 0 46 35 33 34 28 25 28 30 29
ARC 0 0 3 19 12 12 10 6 7 9 9 10
OHIO
PLC 0 0 0 49 37 35 36 30 27 30 32 31
ARC 0 40 0 14 8 9 9 8 7 9 9 9
TEXAS
PLC 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ARC 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER STATES
PLC 0 0 1 210 158 149 153 129 115 126 135 134
ARC 0 0 0 62 39 33 30 26 27 35 39 42
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Table A.3: State Model - Wheat Calculated Means
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
KANSAS
PLC 225 109 56 151 167 176 169 162 164 167 166 170
ARC 0 0 8 13 14 18 14 12 15 15 16 16
NORTH DAKOTA
PLC 201 97 50 135 149 157 151 145 146 149 148 151
ARC 124 113 0 23 18 15 12 15 13 13 14 13
MONTANA
PLC 131 63 32 87 96 102 97 94 94 96 96 98
ARC 73 66 0 2 3 3 3 4 5 6 5 5
OKLAHOMA
PLC 126 61 31 84 93 98 94 90 91 93 92 94
ARC 0 39 36 6 7 7 6 5 6 6 6 5
TEXAS
PLC 91 44 22 60 67 70 68 65 65 67 66 68
ARC 13 20 0 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
COLORADO
PLC 57 28 14 38 42 45 43 41 41 42 42 43
ARC 13 0 16 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4
WASHINGTON
PLC 99 48 25 66 73 77 74 71 72 73 73 74
ARC 55 13 0 4 6 8 7 7 6 7 6 7
SOUTH DAKOTA
PLC 63 30 16 42 46 49 47 45 45 46 46 47
ARC 35 35 0 5 3 4 3 4 5 5 5 5
NEBRASKA
PLC 42 20 10 28 31 32 31 30 30 31 31 31
ARC 15 6 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
OTHER
PLC 350 170 87 234 258 272 261 251 253 258 257 263
ARC 261 215 1 14 20 23 22 23 27 29 29 29
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Table A.4: State Model - Seed Cotton Calculated Means
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
TEXAS
PLC 0 0 66 282 271 249 234 210 185 190 179 175
ARC 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
MISSISSIPPI
PLC 0 0 25 108 104 95 90 80 71 73 68 67
ARC 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
GEORGIA
PLC 0 0 21 91 88 80 76 68 60 61 58 56
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CALIFORNIA
PLC 0 0 32 137 131 120 113 102 90 92 87 85
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ARKANSAS
PLC 0 0 17 73 70 64 61 54 48 49 46 45
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LOUISIANA
PLC 0 0 15 62 60 55 52 46 41 42 40 39
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NORTH CAROLINA
PLC 0 0 12 52 50 45 43 38 34 35 33 32
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TENNESSEE
PLC 0 0 10 44 42 39 37 33 29 30 28 27
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ALABAMA
PLC 0 0 9 40 38 35 33 29 26 27 25 25
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER
PLC 0 0 29 125 121 111 104 93 82 84 80 78
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table A.5: State Model - Peanuts Calculated Means
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
GEORGIA
PLC 251 137 173 170 167 164 164 162 163 165 170 174
ARC 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TEXAS
PLC 116 63 80 79 77 76 76 75 75 76 79 80
ARC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ALABAMA
PLC 73 40 56 55 54 53 53 52 53 53 55 56
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NORTH CAROLINA
PLC 48 26 36 36 35 34 34 34 34 35 36 36
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FLORIDA
PLC 49 27 37 36 36 35 35 35 35 35 36 37
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OKLAHOMA
PLC 25 14 19 19 18 18 18 18 18 18 19 19
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SOUTH CAROLINA
PLC 24 13 18 18 18 17 17 17 17 17 18 18
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VIRGINIA
PLC 23 12 17 17 17 16 16 16 16 16 17 17
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER
PLC 15 8 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 12
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table A.6: State Model - Sorghum Calculated Means
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
KANSAS
PLC 129 81 72 106 81 83 80 80 81 81 83 82
ARC 0 0 0 13 9 8 7 6 5 5 6 6
TEXAS
PLC 110 69 62 91 69 71 68 69 69 69 71 70
ARC 20 4 19 8 5 4 3 3 4 4 4 4
NEBRASKA
PLC 24 15 14 20 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
ARC 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
MISSOURI
PLC 20 13 11 16 12 13 12 12 12 12 13 13
ARC 4 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
OKLAHOMA
PLC 9 6 5 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
ARC 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NEW MEXICO
PLC 8 5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
ARC 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
COLORADO
PLC 5 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
ARC 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ARKANSAS
PLC 8 5 5 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
ARC 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SOUTH DAKOTA
PLC 6 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
ARC 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER
PLC 18 11 10 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
ARC 6 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table A.7: State Model - Long Grain Rice Calculated Means
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
ARKANSAS
PLC 436 248 316 321 313 286 267 250 244 241 240 239
ARC 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LOUISIANA
PLC 173 98 125 127 124 113 106 99 97 95 95 95
ARC 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TEXAS
PLC 145 82 105 106 104 95 89 83 81 80 80 79
ARC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MISSISSIPPI
PLC 88 50 64 65 64 58 54 51 49 49 49 48
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MISSOURI
PLC 63 36 46 46 45 41 39 36 35 35 35 35
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CALIFORNIA
PLC 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER STATES
PLC 4 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table A.8: State Model - Medium Grain and Short Grain Rice Calculated Means
FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 FY 22 FY 23 FY 24 FY 25 FY 26 FY 27 FY 28 FY 29
ARKANSAS
PLC 29 17 15 17 17 21 21 21 20 20 19 18
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LOUISIANA
PLC 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TEXAS
PLC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MISSOURI
PLC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Temperate Japonica Rice (California Medium Grain)
CALIFORNIA
PLC 82 0 0 23 29 92 101 109 99 98 81 76
ARC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: California in this table is based on Temperate Japonica Rice.
